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Abstract
SOS meta-theory has been very successful in deﬁning meta-theorems using which one can prove useful
properties about language constructs. These meta-theorems can save pages of standard proof thanks to
their generic and language-independent formulation. Security properties of language constructs look like
promising candidates to be turned into SOS meta-theorems and there has already been an attempt in this
direction in the context of process calculi security.
In this paper, we give an exploratory account of this issue in the context of language-based security. To
do this, we give a superﬁcial overview of information-ﬂow security and in particular, non-interference as
a central notion in this ﬁeld. Then, we point out some interesting links between non-interference and our
recent work on notions of bisimulation with data. Finally, some ideas regarding SOS meta-theorems for
these notions are presented.
Keywords: :Formal Semantics, Structural Operational Semantics, Language-based security,
Non-interference
1 Introduction
SOS meta-theory [1] has been very successful in deﬁning general criteria with which
one can guarantee useful properties about the language constructs. These meta-
theorems can save pages of standard proof thanks to their generic and language-
independent formulation. Security properties of language constructs look like
promising candidates to be turned into SOS meta-theorems and there has already
been an attempt in this direction [10] in the context of process calculi security [3]. In
this paper, we give an exploratory account of this issue in the context of language-
based security [9]. A number of the ideas presented here can be applied directly to
process calculi security.
In the rest of this paper, we give a superﬁcial overview of information-ﬂow
security [9] and in particular non-interference [4] as a central notion in this ﬁeld.
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Then, we explore some interesting links between non-interference and our recent
work on notions of bisimulation with data [5]. Some ideas regarding SOS meta-
theorems for these notions will follow in Section 3. Section 4 concludes the paper
and points out future work.
2 Non-Interference and Bisimulation
An important aspect of security is conﬁdentiality. Conﬁdentiality means that sen-
sitive, or higher-level, information is never revealed in the course of interactions
to lower-level users. In other words, conﬁdentiality assures that higher-level infor-
mation never leaks to lower-levels. A simplistic scenario for information leakage is
through explicit assignment of high-level data items to low-level observable variables
but it goes far beyond that. A low-level user may infer information about high-level
data items by very implicit observations, exploiting so-called covert channels, e.g.,
by measuring execution time or power consumption.
Non-interference [4,9] is an important means to assuring end-to-end conﬁden-
tiality. It simply means that one cannot deduce anything about the high-level
data/behavior by observing the low-level part of the system. In addition to conﬁ-
dentiality, non-interference has recently been exploited to support other aspects of
security such as availability [11].
Suppose that we have a programming/speciﬁcation language with two levels of
conﬁdentiality for data types. We denote the operational state of the program with
〈p, h, l〉 where p is the program text, h is the higher level data and l is the low
level data, all based on given domains P , H and L. Suppose that the operational
semantics of a program is deﬁned in terms of labeled transitions between the above-
mentioned states with labels χ ∈ X.
In our setting, a program is called non-interfering if regardless of the higher-level
data state, it can always generate the same behavior as well as the lower-level data
part during its execution. In order to formalize this informal explanation a number
of choices has to be made. First of all a notion of behavior has to be ﬁxed and here,
for simplicity, we choose the (strong) bisimulation semantics. Exploring the same
ideas in the weaker semantics remains of course an interesting continuation of our
work. Another important choice concerns the change in the higher-level data state.
One may choose an open system semantics in which the higher-level data state can
change arbitrarily during the execution or go for a closed system semantics in which
higher-level data can only be changed by the entities speciﬁed in the system. We
investigate both possibilities in the rest of this paper and propose two notions of
non-interference, called SL non-interference and ISL non-interference, for open and
closed systems, respectively.
Then, the following deﬁnitions (inspired by low-bisimilarity of [8] and bisimula-
tion with data of [5]) are two possible formalizations of non-interference.
Deﬁnition 2.1 (SLNI Bisimulation and SL Non-Interference) A symmet-
ric relation R ⊆ P 2 is called a StateLess Non-Interference (SLNI) bisim-
ulation relation when ∀(p,q)∈R, ∀hp,l,l′,χ,p′,h′p 〈p, hp, l〉
χ
→〈p′, h′p, l
′〉 ⇒ ∀hq ∃q′,h′q
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〈q, hq, l〉
χ
→〈q′, h′q, l
′〉 ∧(p′, q′) ∈ R. Programs p and q are SLNI-bisimilar, denoted
by p ↔slni q when there exists an SLNI-bisimulation relation containing (p, q). A
program p is SL non-Interfering when p ↔slni p.
Note that unlike usual notions of bisimilarity, SLNI bisimilarity is not necessarily
reﬂexive and hence, not an equivalence. Intuitively, the above non-interference
deﬁnition requires for the non-interfering program to reproduce the same low-level
data state regardless of the high-level state. The interesting part of the deﬁnition is
that at each transition, the programs are compared using all possible high-level and
all equal low-level data states. This resembles our notion of stateless bisimulation
in [5]. As we motivate there, stateless bisimulation is very robust and compositional
but it is usually very strong and diﬃcult to establish. A similar observation can be
made with respect to SLNI bisimulation and SL non-interference. An alternative
for SL non-interference is the notion of ISL non-interference deﬁned below.
Deﬁnition 2.2 (SBNI Bisimulation and ISL Non-Interference) A symmet-
ric relation R ⊆ (P × H)2 is called a StateBased Non-Interference (SBNI) bisim-
ulation relation when ∀((p,hp),(q,hq))∈R, ∀l,l′,χ,p′,h′p 〈p, hp, l〉
χ
→〈p′, h′p, l
′〉 ⇒ ∃q′,h′
q
〈q, hq, l〉
χ
→〈q′, h′q, l
′〉 ∧((p′, h′p), (q
′, h′q)) ∈ R. Programs p and q are Initially State-
Less Non-Interference (ISLNI)-bisimilar, denoted by p ↔islni q when there exists
an SBNI-bisimulation relation containing ((p, hp), (q, hq)) for all hp, hq ∈ H. A
program p is ISL non-Interfering when p ↔islni p.
The above deﬁnition is motivated by the fact that low-level state can be observed
and changed by low-level users while the change in the high-level state is in the
hand of the system and if the system is closed, we need not cater for intermediate
changes in the high-level states. Note that ISL non-interference is weaker that SL
non-interference. We illustrate the above two deﬁnitions and their diﬀerences using
the following simple examples.
Example 2.3 Consider a programming language with the terminating constant
skip, the assignment, conditional (if then else) and the sequential composition
(;) operators with the expected operational semantics. Assignment (:=) and con-
dition (==) may compare and assign variables with/to values or other variables,
respectively. Suppose that h is a high-level variable and l is a low-level one.
The following programs l := h and if (h == 5) then l := 6 else l := 7 are
neither SL nor ISL non-interfering, for they lead to diﬀerent behavior or low-level
values depending on the initial value of the high-level variable h.
Also, if (h == 5) then h := 6 else skip is neither SL nor ISL non-interfering
since depending on the initial value of h, it immediately terminates or takes one
more assignment step. This kind of behavior is a good source for a timing covert
channel.
However, programs h := 5 ; l := h and h := l ; if (h == l)then h :=
6 else skip are both ISL but not SL non-interfering. In case there is no concurrent
change to the higher-level variable, a low-level observer cannot infer anything about
the higher-level variable by looking at diﬀerent executions of the above programs.
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But by putting these programs in parallel with a higher-level component, we may
observe diﬀerent behavior and end-results depending on the intermediate values of
the higher-level variable. For example, regarding the program h := 5 ; l := h, after
execution of the ﬁrst assignment the program evolves into l := h. It clearly does not
hold that l := h is non-interfering since the value of l is determined by, now not
necessarily ﬁxed, value of h.
3 On Rule Formats for Non-Interference
Structural Operational Semantics [6] is a commonly accepted method to deﬁne
labeled transition semantics for languages. A semantic speciﬁcation in the SOS
style comprises a number of deduction rules deﬁning possible transitions of a piece
of syntax based on transitions of its constituting parts. Rule formats [1] deﬁne
certain syntactic forms of deduction rules to be “safe” for certain purposes.
A distinguished class of rule formats is concerned with congruence of notions
of behavioral equivalence. Translated into our terms, congruence of a behavioral
equivalence usually means compositionality of the corresponding notion of non-
interference. That is why in [10], a particular congruence format is used as a basis
for a rule-format for proving non-interference. Following this approach, the sfsl
and sﬁsl formats of [5] provide a convenient starting point. However, we intend to
investigating the following possibilities for improving upon the format of [10] in our
settings:
(i) we would like to investigate separating the concerns of non-interference and
its compositionality. This, in our mind, will simplify the resulting (this time,
two separate) rule formats. Using one rule format one can check whether a
non-interference property holds for a particular construct and using the other
format one can check the robustness of the proven non-interference under dif-
ferent contexts. The rule format reported in [10] is, to our subjective judgment,
too complicated to be understood and checked by a practitioner in this ﬁeld
and we hope that our proposal for separation of concerns will simplify the
outcomes.
(ii) Secondly, we propose to study compositionality and non-interference for re-
stricted language contexts and constructs, respectively. This is in contrast
with the common practice of using SOS meta-theory for proving a property
of a language as a whole. We can hardly imagine that any general-purpose
language will provide compositional non-interference for all of its syntactically
valid programs but rather, it is desirable to check whether a particular lan-
guage construct (or a composed context) is non-interfering. For example, any
language with a general assignment operator should not ﬁt such a format while
certain patterns of assignment can be easily proven to be non-interfering.
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4 Conclusions
In this paper, we presented some ideas for notions of language-based non-
interference based on notions of bisimulation with data. Subsequently, we sug-
gested some starting points for devising a standard SOS format guaranteeing non-
interference for restricted contexts. It still remains to research the initial ideas
presented in this paper in order to propose a concrete format for language-based
non-interference. We expect that our work can be inspired by and extend the ex-
isting work on types systems for non-interference (e.g., [2,7]).
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